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Book Reviews

MIDDLE GROUND?
SAME SEX DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES. By Andrew
Koppelman. 1 Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xviii + 204.
Hardback $35.00.
Patrick J. Borcher/

Andrew Koppelman, Professor of Law and Political Science
at Northwestern University, is one of the most prolific and influential commentators on the same-sex marriage debate and the
conflict-of-laws questions that it presents. His thoughtful and
well-written book, entitled Same, Sex, Different States: When
Marriages Cross State Lines, 3 is an important contribution to this
literature.
The book draws on Koppelman's earlier writings on the
same-sex marriage issue, the federal Defense of Marriage Act
"DOMA", 4 and related topics. In it he attempts to stake a middle
ground between the "pro-recognition" and the "anti-recognition"
camps with regard to same-sex marriages solemnized in states or
nations that allow such unions.
One of the most admirable features of the book is that it
avoids overstating its case or embracing any of the easy solutions
that, while appealing to one side or the other, do not hold up to
scrutiny. Thus Koppelman quite rightly rejects the "Full Faith
1.
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and Credit" solution advanced by the pro-recognition camp that
dominated the popular press and some law review articles written shortlr after the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr
v. Lewin. That decision, which appeared likely to make the
Aloha State the first to allow same-sex marriages, provoked the
federal DOMA, which Koppelman quite rightly notes was aimed
at a mostly imaginary target (pp. 116-18).
The far-fetched notion that led to the federal DOMA was
that same-sex marriage would be a sort of card trick in which
one card is flipped over and the whole rest of the deck follows. 6
As Koppelman quite rightly notes, this argument depended on a
thorough confusion of what constitutes a "judgment" for fullfaith-and-credit purposes (p. 118). For a marriage to have this
"card trick" effect, it would have to involve the actual resolution
of disputed issues. But, of course, the decision to enter into a
marriage is not a disputed matter in the way that a divorce can
be. It's simply not the case that Pat wants to get married to Fran,
but Fran doesn't want to get married to Pat, and they have to go
to a judge who will then decide whether they are to be married
or not.
On the other end of the spectrum is the solution advanced
by some in the anti-recognition camp. That camp proposes to
amend the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex marriages. Although opinion polls show that a large majority of Americans
are opposed to same-sex marriage in principle, 7 it seems unlikely
that the political will to amend the Constitution exists. Moreover, since opposition to same-sex marriage is much weaker
among younger adults, the solution of amending the Constitution seems unlikely to gain momentum with the passage of time
(p. 152).
With total victory for either side out of reach, the question
to which Koppelman addresses himself is how best to mediate
the kulturkampf between the small number of states who have
institutionalized same-sex unions 8 and the 40 or so states who
have by positive law expressed their opposition (p. 138).
5. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
6. See Patrick J. Borchers. Baker v. General Motors: lmpliwtions }in lnterjurisdiLtional Rewgnition of Non- Traditional Marriages. 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147. 152-54
(1998).
7. /d. at 150.
8. Prompted by their state high courts. currently Vermont and New Jersey have
laws that confer essentially all the benefits of marriage on same-sex couples who go
through a "civil union" ceremony. Massachusetts has by decree of the Supreme Judicial
Court extended its marriage laws to include same-sex couples. The developments in
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The engine driving the potential for policy disputes is the lex
loci celebrationis (or "the law of the place of the celebration") rule
in the conflict of laws. The general rule, from time immemorial,
has been that a marriage that is valid under the law of the state in
which it is celebrated is valid everywhere. 9 This raises the possibility that once a state recognizes same-sex marriage (and, unlike
Massachusetts, does not have a "marriage evasion" statute 10),
couples barred from marrying in their home states will travel to
states that allow their marriages and then return home and claim
the status of a married couple. Now, as noted above and several
times by Koppelman, this is not a rule of constitutional compulsion. The place-of-celebration rule has always been subject to a
public policy exception which has allowed states to refuse to recognize out-of-state marriages against which the state has a
deeply-felt policy.''
The same-sex marriage debate is not, of course, the first
such policy conflict to present these quandaries. Before the U.S.
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia 12 struck down state laws
barring inter-racial marriages, states that barred such unions
faced similar questions with inter-racial couples who had been
validly married elsewhere. Koppelman carefully plumbs these
cases for lessons they might teach but is, again, careful to not
overstate his case by claiming that they present a perfect analogy
(p. 49).
Koppelman usefully groups marriage questions into four
different classes. 13 One is "Evasive Marriages" in which a couple
Vermont and Massachusetts are discussed extensively (pp. 8-11). The New Jersey Supreme Court decision is Lewis v. Harris. '}08 A.2d 1% (N.J. 2006). In a divided decision.
the high court of New York recently rejected the argument that its state constitution confers a right of same-sex marriage. See Hernandez v. Robles. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
'}_ Borchers, supra note 6. at 154-58.
10. In Cote- Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health. 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006), the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Massachusetts marriage evasion statute in application to
out-of-state same-sex couples domiciled in states that prohibit same-sex marriage.
11. Borchers. supra note 6. at 157-58.
12. 388 U.S. 1 (1'}67).
13. One quibble I have with Koppelman's taxonomy is that the willingness of courts
to sustain attacks on marriages has always tended to depend on whether the marriage
was being challenged by one of the parties to the marriage or by a third party whose
rights depended upon the validity of the marriage. such as in questions of inheritance. See
Borchers. supra note 6. at 157. Thus. for instance. in Chapter 2 Koppelman discusses at
length the famous case of Wilkins v. Zelichowski. 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1 '}58). in which a wife
who was underage under the law of her domicile was able to annul a marriage that was
apparently valid where celebrated. Koppelman uses Wilkins as an example of the public
policy doctrine invalidating what he would categorize as an "evasive" marriage. However. similarly "evasive" marriages have been upheld against attack on public policy
grounds probably because the party attacking it was not one of the spouses. See, e.g.. In
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domiciled in a state that does not allow for same-sex marriages
travels to a state that allows them to get married and then returns home (pp. 102-06). A second is "Migratory Marriages" in
which a couple is genuinely domiciled in a state that allows their
union but then later re-domiciles in a state that prohibits their
marriage (pp. 106-10). A third is "Visitor Marriages" in which a
couple validly married under the law of their home state is visiting in a state that does not allow same-sex marriages but has
need during the visit to take advantage of one of the incidents of
the marriage, for instance, a right to make health care decisions
for an incapacitated spouse (pp. 110-11 ). The fourth is "Extraterritorial Marriages" in which a legal relation in a state other
than the couple's marital domicile turns on their marital status
(pp. 112-13). An example here might be an intestate beneficiary
living in a state that does not allow same-sex marriages whose
right to inherit turns upon whether a same-sex couple living in a
state that permits such marriages is treated as married.
At the risk of over-simplification, Koppelman proposes a
reorientation of marriage law away from the place-ofcelebration nexus to a domiciliary nexus. Thus he argues that
states who prohibit same-sex marriages should be free to ignore
evasive marriages but that they should recognize marriages in
the visitor and extraterritorial cases. In the migratory case he
proposes that states which prohibit same-sex marriages be allowed to refuse to recognize them as marriages subject to their
recognizing some of the incidents of the marriage, particularly
those that he terms "non-marital" rights, i.e., ones that could be
created in the absence of a marriage (p. 110).
re May's Estate. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953). Koppelman also at one point (pp. 23-24).
stretches the traditional public policy doctrine beyond its bounds when he criticizes the
New York Court of Appeals' decision in Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft. 14
N.E.2d 79H (N.Y. 193H). Although all can agree that the dreadful Nazi-era laws involved
in that case violated every norm of natural justice. the public policy defense was always
limited to preventing enforcement of foreign rights that violated the forum's public policy (such as those involving foreign marriages). It had never been understood to allow
the rejection or a foreign defense to essentially create a right of action that would not
have been known under foreign law. Thus, had Holzer involved the German company
attempting to claim a breach of contract against the plaintiff Holzer, rather than the
other way around. I have little doubt but that New York's high court would have dismissed the German company's suit on public policy grounds. Koppelman. however. has
distinguished company in this view as the New York Court of Appeals so stretched the
public policy doctrine in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961) to
reject the Massachusetts limitation on wrongful death recovery. This. however. was a
short-lived innovation as two years later New York adopted a version of interest analysis
for resolve conflicts and essentially recast Kilherg as an interest analysis case. See Babcock v. Jackson. 191 !'<.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). However. no part of Koppelman's central
argument depends to any great degree on these points.
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It is conceivable that such a reorientation, or at least a partial one, might take place. In my first writing on the same-sex
marriage debate, I suggested, in what Koppelman would call the
"migratory" case, that even non-recognizing states might well
give some effect to such marriages. 14
The real question, however, as Koppelman notes, is the collision between his proposed reorientation and many of the state
statutes and constitutional amendments (often called "miniDOMAs) (pp. 137-48) that were drafted not only to make clear
that marriages must be of the opposite-sex variety but also addressed the conflict-of-laws issues that might be presented by
same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other states. Many of
these statutes appear to prohibit the reorientation that Koppelman proposes and would prevent recognition even in the visitor
and extraterritorial cases (pp. 146-48).
The coming collision, Koppelman argues (correctly, in my
view) is between some of these more expansive mini-DOMAs
and the U.S. Supreme Court's line of cases beginning with Romer v. Evans. 15 Romer invalidated Colorado's "Amendment 2"
which prohibited homosexuals from claiming any special status
under state or local law. Romer is an extraordinarily slippery
case that has led some lower courts to declare mini-DOMAs unconstitutional.16 The Court's opinion is slippery because its holding that Colorado's amendment lacked any "rational basis" is
difficult to cabin unless one is willing to accept the proposition
that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal
protection purposes, a view the Romer majority apparently disclaimed.17

In any event, however, Romer's relationship to the same-sex
marriage debate seemed attenuated as long as Bowers v. Hardwick, 18 the Supreme Court decision upholding Georgia's sodomy
law, remained good law. For if states were allowed to criminalize
same-sex sex without running afoul of the Constitution, it was
difficult (to say the least) to imagine how the Constitution could

14. Borchers. supra note o. at 185 ("I suspect that many states will give some effect
to same-sex marriages even if they don't give them full effect. and the effect they give
may depend on the circumstances of the marriage.").
15. 517 u.s. o20 (l'l'lo).
16. See, e.g.. Citizens for Equal Protection. Inc. v. Bruning. 3o8 F. Supp. 2d '180 (D.
Neb. 2005). rev'd 455 F.3d 85'1 (8th C!r. 200o).
17. Romer.517U.S.at630-31.
18. 478 u.s. 186 (1 'li\6).
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compel them to recognize same-sex marriages or even to give
them partial effect.
But then came Lawrence v. Texas, 19 in which the Court
struck down Texas's sodomy law and expressly overruled Bowers. The question of the effect of Romer and its progeny on
same-sex marriages is now a much closer one. As Justice Scalia
noted in his Lawrence dissent, the logic of the majority's opinion
seems to cut away many of the constitutional obstacles to the institutional recognition of same-sex marriage, 20 to say nothing of
Koppelman's more moderate proposal of partial recognition.
I will venture no prediction as to whether the Supreme
Court will extend Romer far enough to pave the way for Koppelman's proposed reorientation. However, the same slippery
slope that has worked to the advantage of the pro-recognition
camp by bringing about Lawrence and setting up the arguments
for the Romer line's extension may become its enemy. Some of
the force of the argument in favor of same-sex marriage would
seem to apply as well to other minority sexual unions. 21 Of
course, there may well be principled ways in which to distinguish
same-sex unions from other minority unions. But probably those
distinctions will have to be made clear before we see widespread
judicial acceptance of even Koppelman's middle ground.
However the future unfolds, Same Sex, Different States:
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines is a significant and
positive addition to the discussion.

u.s.

19. 539
55i\ (2003).
20. !d. at 600 (Scalia. J .. dissenting) (referring to the equal protection argument
against laws forbidding sodomy: "But this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection.
since it is precisely the same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with someone of the same sex while permitting marriage with someone
of the opposite sex.").
21. Two obvious examples are sexual unions between adult siblings and polygamous unions. Although less common than same-sex unions, such unions are not rare. See,
e.g .. Blood Ties. THE GUARDIAN. Feb. 28. 2007. p. 12 (detailing relationship between
German brother and sister that resulted in the birth of four children and discussing their
efforts to challenge the provision in the German civil code criminalizing their sexual relationship and noting that Sweden apparently allows marriages between half-siblings).
Sexual attraction between adult siblings is apparently common if the siblings were raised
apart. See Nigel Hawkes, Tahoo of lncesl Explained hy Re/acive Boredom, THE TIMES.
Apr. 3. 1995. In some states. polygamous unions are estimated to account for as much as
2% of the population. See Ucah Paying a High Price for Polygamy; Law: Child ahuse and
we/ji1re fraud are pare of plural marriage's col/, LA. TIMES, Sep. 9. 2001. p. A 1. The possibility for a constitutional challenge to laws prohibiting polygamous marriages is more
than theoretical. In State v. Holm. 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006), the Utah Supreme Court in
a split decision upheld against a Lawrence challenge a bigamy prosecution of a man who
after lawfully marrying his first wife entered into a marriage-like ceremony with another
woman and then later the 16-year-old sister of his first wife.

